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Abstract. Over the last years, we have seen several security incidents
that compromised system safety, of which some caused physical harm
to people. Meanwhile, various risk assessment methods have been devel-
oped that integrate safety and security, and these could help to address
the corresponding threats by implementing suitable risk treatment plans.
However, an overarching overview of these methods, systematizing the
characteristics of such methods, is missing. In this paper, we conduct a
systematic literature review, and identify 7 integrated safety and security
risk assessment methods. We analyze these methods based on 5 different
criteria, and identify key characteristics and applications. A key outcome
is the distinction between sequential and non-sequential integration of
safety and security, related to the order in which safety and security
risks are assessed. This study provides a basis for developing more effec-
tive integrated safety and security risk assessment methods in the future.
Keywords: Integrated safety and security risk assessment · Risk analysis
· Risk evaluation · Risk identification · Safety risk assessment · Security
risk assessment
1 Introduction
Information technologies and communication devices are increasingly being inte-
grated into modern control systems [1]. These modern control systems are used
to operate life-critical systems where the human lives are at stake in case of
failure. At the same time, they are often vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which may
cause physical impact. An incident in Lodz is a typical example where a cyber-
attack resulted in the derailment of 4 trams, and the injury of 12 people [2]. It is
therefore becoming increasingly important to address the combination of safety
and security in modern control systems.
However, safety and security have been represented by separate communities
in both academia and industry [3]. In our context, we think of the safety com-
munity as dealing with unintentional/non-malicious threats caused by natural
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disasters, technical failures, and human error. On the other hand, we think of
the security community as dealing with intentional/malicious threats caused by
intentional human behavior.
Risk management plays a major role in dealing with both unintentional/non-
malicious, and intentional/malicious threats. In the recent years, we have seen
a transformation among the researchers of safety and security community to
work together especially in risk management. As an example, there are develop-
ments of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods [4,5,6,7,8,9,10].
Risk assessment is one of the most crucial parts of the risk management pro-
cess as it is the basis for making risk treatment decisions [11]. The integrated
safety and security risk assessment method helps to improve the completeness
of risk assessment conducted by covering the interactions between malicious and
non-malicious risks. However, a comprehensive review of integrated safety and
security risk assessment methods which could help to identify their key char-
acteristics and applications is lacking. Therefore, this research aims to fill this
gap by addressing the research question: “What are the key characteristics of
integrated safety and security risk assessment methods, and their applications?”.
The research objectives are:
• RO 1. To identify integrated safety and security risk assessment methods.
• RO 2. To identify key characteristics and applications of integrated safety
and security risk assessment methods based on the analysis of identified
methods.
The scope of this analysis covers important features of identified integrated
safety and security risk assessment methods mainly, in terms of how these meth-
ods are created, and what the existing applications of these methods are. The
analysis of identified methods is performed based on the following criteria: I.
Citations in the Scientific Literature, II. Steps Involved, III. Stage(s) of Risk
Assessment Process Addressed, IV. Integration Methodology, and V. Applica-
tion(s) and Application Domain. The motivations for selecting these criteria are
described in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
related work, followed by the review methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, we
present the identified integrated safety and security risk assessment methods,
and describe the steps involved in these methods. In Section 5, we perform
the analysis of identified methods based on the criteria that we defined above.
Finally, we highlight key characteristics and applications of integrated safety
and security risk assessment methods followed by a discussion of future work
directions in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Cherdantseva et al. presented 24 cybersecurity risk assessment methods for Su-
pervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [12]. In addition, they
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analyzed the presented methods based on the following criteria: I. Aim, II. Ap-
plication domain, III. Stages of risk management addressed, IV. Key concepts
of risk management covered, V. Impact measurement, VI. Sources of data for
deriving probabilities, VII. Evaluation method, and VIII. Tool support. Based
on the analysis, they suggested the following categorization schemes: I. Level
of detail and coverage, II. Formula-based vs. Model-based, III. Qualitative vs.
Quantitative, and IV. Source of probabilistic data. However, Cherdantseva et
al. did not present integrated safety and security risk assessment methods. We
used and complemented some of the criteria provided by Cherdantseva et al. to
perform the analysis of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods
as described in Section 5.
Risk assessment methods like Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
[13], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [14], Component Fault Tree (CFT) [15] have
been used by safety community whereas the risk assessment methods like At-
tack Trees [16], Attack-Countermeasure Trees (ACT) [17], National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-30 Risk Assessment [18] have been used
by security community. Several authors used these methods as a starting point
for the development of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods.
Kriaa et al. highlighted standard initiatives such as ISA-99 (Working Group
7), IEC TC65 (Ad Hoc Group 1), IEC 62859, DO-326/ED-202 that consider
safety and security co-ordination for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [1]. They
described various generic approaches that considered safety and security at a
macroscopic level of system design or risk evaluation, and also model-based ap-
proaches that rely on a formal or semi-formal representation of the functional/non-
functional aspects of system. They classified the identified approaches based on
the following criteria: I. Unification vs. Integration, II. Development vs. Op-
erational, and III. Qualitative vs. Quantitative. However, Kriaa et al. did not
primarily focus on integrated safety and security risk assessment methods that
have been already applied in at least one real-case/example involving control
system. Also, Kriaa et al. did not identify key characteristics and applications
of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods. We included methods
such as Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities, and Effect Analysis (FMVEA) [7], Ex-
tended Component Fault Tree (CFT) [9], and Extended Fault Tree (EFT) [10]
from Kriaa et al. in our work as they satisfy our selection criteria. In addition, we
included other methods that satisfy our selection criteria, such as Security-Aware
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) [4], Combined Harm Assess-
ment of Safety and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS) [5], Failure-
Attack-CountTermeasure (FACT) Graph [6], and Unified Security and Safety
Risk Assessment [8].
3 Review Methodology
This section describes the methodology for selecting the integrated safety and
security risk assessment methods. The selection of these methods mainly consists
of two stages:
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• Searches were performed on IEEE Xplore Digital Library, ACM Digital Li-
brary, Scopus, DBLP, andWeb of Science – All Databases. The search-strings
were constructed from keywords “Attack”, “Failure”, “Hazard”, “Integra-
tion”, “Risk”, “Safety”, “Security”, and “Threat”. DBLP provided a good
coverage of relevant journals and conferences.
• Methods were selected from the search results according to the following
criteria:
– The method should address any or all of the following risk assessment
stages: risk identification, risk analysis, and/or risk evaluation.
– The method should consider both unintentional and intentional threats.
– The method should have been already applied in at least one real-case/
example involving control system.
– The literature should be in English language.
Once an integrated safety and security risk assessment method was selected,
the scientific literature that cited it was also traced.
4 Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment
Methods
This section presents the identified integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods, and describes the steps involved in these methods. This section aims
to address the RO 1. Based on the review methodology described in Section 3,
we have identified 7 integrated safety and security risk assessment methods: I.
SAHARA [4], II. CHASSIS [5], III. FACT Graph [6], IV. FMVEA [7], V. Unified
Security and Safety Risk Assessment [8], VI. Extended CFT [9], and VII. EFT
[10].
4.1 SAHARA Method
The steps involved in the SAHARA method [4] are as follows: I. The ISO 26262
– Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) approach is used in a conven-
tional manner to classify the safety hazards according to the Automotive Safety
Integrity Level (ASIL), and to identify the safety goal and safe state for each
identified potential hazard; II. The attack vectors of the system are modelled.
The STRIDE method is used to model the attack vectors of the system [4,19];
III. The security threats are quantified according to the Required Resources (R),
Required Know-how (K), and Threat Criticality (T); IV. The security threats
are classified according to the Security Level (SecL). SecL is determined based
on the level of R, K, and T; V. Finally, the security threats that may violate the
safety goals (T>2) are considered for the further safety analysis.
4.2 CHASSIS Method
The steps involved in the CHASSIS method [5] are as follows: I. The elicitation
of functional requirements which involve creating the use-case diagrams that in-
corporates the users, system functions and services; II. The elicitation of safety
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and security requirements which involve creating misuse case diagram based on
the identified scenarios for safety and security involving faulty-systems and at-
tackers respectively; III. Trade-off discussions are used to support the resolution
of conflict between the safety, and security mitigations.
4.3 FACT Graph Method
The steps involved in the FACT Graph method [6] are as follows: I. The fault
trees of the system analyzed are imported to start the construction of FACT
graph; II. The safety countermeasures are attached to the failure nodes in the
FACT graph; III. The attack trees of the system analyzed are imported to the
FACT graph in construction. This is done by adding an attack-tree to the failure
node in the FACT graph with the help of OR gate, if the particular failure may
also be caused by an attack; IV. The security countermeasures are attached to
the attack nodes in the FACT graph. This could be done based on the ACT
technique [17].
4.4 FMVEA Method
The steps involved in the FMVEA method [7] are as follows: I. A functional
analysis at the system level is performed to get the list of system components;
II. A component that needs to be analyzed from the list of system components
is selected; III. The failure/threat modes for the selected component are iden-
tified; IV. The failure/threat effect for each identified failure/threat mode is
identified; V. The severity for the identified failure/threat effect is determined;
VI. The potential failure causes/vulnerabilities/threat agents are identified; VII.
The failure/attack probability is determined. Schmittner et al. described the at-
tack probability as the sum of threat properties and system susceptibility ratings.
The threat properties is the sum of motivation and capabilities ratings, whereas
the system susceptibility is the sum of reachability and unusualness of the sys-
tem ratings; VIII. Finally, the risk number is determined, which is the product
of severity rating and failure/attack probability.
4.5 Unified Security and Safety Risk Assessment Method
The steps involved in the Unified Security and Safety Risk Assessment method
[8] are as follows: I. The system boundary, system functions, system and data
criticality, system and data sensitivity are identified; II. The threats, hazards,
vulnerabilities, and hazard-initiating events are identified; III. The current and
planned controls are identified; IV. The threat likelihood is determined; V. The
hazard likelihood is determined; VI. The asset impact value is determined; VII.
The combined safety-security risk level is determined; VIII. The control recom-
mendations are provided; IX. The risk assessment reports are provided.
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4.6 Extended CFT Method
The steps involved in the extended CFT method [9] are as follows: I. The CFT
for the system analyzed is developed. This could be done based on [15]; II. The
CFT is extended by adding an attack tree to the failure node with the help of OR
gate, if the particular event may also be caused by an attack; III. The qualitative
analysis is conducted by calculating Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) per top level event.
MCSs containing only one event would be single point of failure which should
be avoided; IV. The quantitative analysis is conducted by assigning values to
the basic events. Therefore, MCSs containing only safety events would have a
probability P, MCSs containing only security events would have a rating R, MCSs
containing both safety and security events would have a tuple of probability and
rating (P, R).
4.7 EFT Method
The steps involved in the EFT method [10] are as follows: I. The fault tree
for the system analyzed is developed by taking into account the random faults;
II. The developed fault tree is extended by adding an attack tree to the basic
or intermediate event in the fault tree, if the particular event in the fault tree
may also be caused by malicious actions. The attack tree concept used in the
development of EFT is based on [20]; III. The quantitative analysis is performed
based on the formulae defined in [10] which help to calculate the top event
probability.
5 Analysis of Integrated Safety and Security Risk
Assessment Methods
This section performs the analysis of integrated safety and security risk assess-
ment methods based on the criteria: I. Citations in the Scientific Literature, II.
Steps Involved, III. Stage(s) of Risk Assessment Process Addressed, IV. Integra-
tion Methodology, and V. Application(s) and Application Domain. This allows
us to identify key characteristics and applications of integrated safety and secu-
rity risk assessment methods. This section aims to address the RO 2.
The integrated safety and security risk assessment methods described in the
previous section are listed in Table 1. In Table 1, country is the country of the
first author of the paper and citations is the number of citations of the paper
according to Google Scholar Citation Index as on 31st August 2016.
From Table 1, we observe that the researchers started to recognize the impor-
tance of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods which resulted
in the increase in number of papers produced especially during 2014, and 2015.
The largest number of citations (63) is acquired by the EFT method published
in 2009. The second most cited paper, among analyzed, with 17 citations, is
the Extended CFT method published in 2013. However, it is understandable
that the methods published during the last few years received lower number of
citations ranging from 1 to 5.
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Table 1. List of Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment Methods (Ordered
by the number of citations)
Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment
Method
Year Country Citations
EFT [10] 2009 Italy 63
Extended CFT [9] 2013 Germany 17
FACT Graph [6] 2015 Singapore 5
CHASSIS [5] 2015 Austria 4
FMVEA [7] 2014 Austria 4
SAHARA [4] 2015 Austria 2
Unified Security and Safety Risk Assessment [8] 2014 Taiwan 1
Based on the steps involved in each method as described in Section 4, we con-
clude that there are two types of integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods:
• Sequential Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment Method: In this
type of method, the safety risk assessment, and security risk assessment are
performed in a particular sequence. For instance, the Extended CFT method
starts with the development of CFT for the system analyzed. Later, the at-
tack tree is added to extend the developed CFT. This method starts with the
safety risk assessment followed by the security risk assessment. Methods such
as SAHARA, FACT Graph, Unified Security and Safety Risk Assessment,
Extended CFT, and EFT come under the sequential type.
• Non-sequential Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment Method: In
this type of method, the safety risk assessment, and security risk assessment
are performed without any particular sequence. For instance, in the FMVEA
method, the results of safety risk assessment and security risk assessment are
tabulated in the same table without any particular sequence. Methods such
as FMVEA and CHASSIS come under the non-sequential type.
Cherdantseva et al. used ‘stage(s) of risk management process addressed’ as
a criteria to analyze the identified cybersecurity risk assessment methods for
SCADA systems [12]. We adapted and used this criteria as ‘stage(s) of risk
assessment process addressed’ because the major focus of our research is on
risk assessment. This criteria will allow us to identify the predominant stage(s)
of risk assessment process addressed by the integrated safety and security risk
assessment methods.
A risk assessment process consists of typically three stages:
• Risk Identification: This is the process of finding, recognizing and describing
the risks [21].
• Risk Analysis: This is the process of understanding the nature, sources, and
causes of the risks that have been identified and to estimate the level of risk
[21].
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• Risk Evaluation: This is the process of comparing risk analysis results with
risk criteria to make risk treatment decisions [21].
Table 2 highlights the integrated safety and security risk assessment method
and the corresponding stage(s) of the risk assessment process addressed. This
is done based on the definitions of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk
evaluation. We also take into account the safety risk assessment method, and
security risk assessment method that were combined in the integrated safety
and security risk assessment method.
Table 2. Stage(s) of Risk Assessment Process Addressed
Integrated Safety and Security Risk
Assessment Method
Risk
Identification
Risk
Analysis
Risk
Evaluation
SAHARA X X ×
CHASSIS X × ×
FACT Graph X × ×
FMVEA X X ×
Unified Security and Safety Risk Assessment X X X
Extended CFT X X ×
EFT X X ×
In Table 2, X(×) indicates that the particular method addressed (did not address)
the corresponding risk assessment stage.
From Table 2, we understand that all methods addressed the risk identifica-
tion, 5 out of 7 methods addressed the risk analysis, whereas only 1 out of 7
methods addressed the risk evaluation stage of the risk assessment process. This
implies that the risk evaluation stage is not given much attention compared to
the other stages of the risk assessment process in the integrated safety and se-
curity risk assessment methods. Cherdantseva et al. also highlighted that the
majority of the cybersecurity risk assessment methods for SCADA systems con-
centrates on the risk identification and risk analysis stages of the risk assessment
process [12].
We used the criteria ‘Integration methodology’ because this will allow us to
understand which combination of safety, and security risk assessment methods
are being used in the integrated safety and security risk assessment methods as
summarized in Table 3.
From Table 3, we observe that there are four ways in which the integrated
safety and security risk assessment methods have been developed:
• Integration through the combination of a conventional safety risk assessment
method and a variation of the conventional safety risk assessment method for
security risk assessment. The methods SAHARA and FMVEA come under
this category.
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Table 3. Integration Methodology
Integrated Safety and
Security Risk
Assessment Method
Safety Risk Assessment
Method
Security Risk
Assessment Method
SAHARA ISO 26262: HARA Variation of ISO 26262:
HARA
CHASSIS Safety Misuse Case (Involv-
ing Faulty-systems)
Security Misuse Case (In-
volving Attackers)
FACT Graph Fault Tree Attack Tree
FMVEA FMEA Variation of FMEA
Unified Security and Safety
Risk Assessment
Variation of NIST 800-30 Se-
curity Risk Estimation
NIST 800-30 Security Risk
Estimation
Extended CFT CFT Attack Tree
EFT Fault Tree Attack Tree
• Integration through the combination of a conventional security risk assess-
ment method and a variation of the conventional security risk assessment
method for safety risk assessment. The Unified Security and Safety Risk
Assessment method come under this category.
• Integration through the combination of a conventional safety risk assessment
method and a conventional security risk assessment method. The methods
FACT Graph, Extended CFT, and EFT come under this category.
• Others - There is no conventional safety risk assessment, and conventional se-
curity risk assessment method used in the integration. The CHASSIS method
come under this category. The CHASSIS method used a variation of Unified
Modeling Language (UML)-based models for both the safety and security
risk assessment.
We used the criteria ‘Application(s) and Application domain’ because this
will allow us to understand the type of application(s), and the corresponding
application domain of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods.
Table 4 highlights the integrated safety and security risk assessment method
and the corresponding application(s) and application domain.
From Table 4, we observe that 4 methods were applied in the transportation
domain, 2 methods were applied in the power and utilities domain, and 1 method
was applied in the chemical domain. The major development, and application of
integrated safety and security risk assessment methods, is in the transportation
domain. The Threat Horizon 2017 listed “death from disruption to digital ser-
vices” as one of the threats especially in the transportation and medical domain
[22]. In the transportation domain, there is a potential for cyber-attacks which
compromises system safety and result in the injury/death of people which was
illustrated by a tram incident in Lodz [2].
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Table 4. Application(s) and Application Domain
Integrated Safety
and Security
Risk Assessment
Method
Application(s) Application
Domain
SAHARA Battery Management System use-case [4] Transportation
CHASSIS Over The Air (OTA) system [5], Air traffic
management remote tower example [23].
Transportation
FACT Graph Over-pressurization of a vessel example [6] Power and Utilities
FMVEA OTA system [5], Telematics con-
trol unit [7], Engine test-stand [24],
Communications-based train control
system [25].
Transportation
Unified Security and
Safety Risk
Assessment
High pressure core flooder case-study [8] Power and Utilities
Extended CFT Adaptive cruise control system [9] Transportation
EFT Release of toxic substance into the environ-
ment example [10]
Chemical
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have identified 7 integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods. Although we cannot completely rule out the existence of other un-
observed integrated safety and security risk assessment methods that fulfil our
selection criteria, the review methodology that we adopted helped to ensure the
acceptable level of completeness in the selection of these methods. Based on the
analysis, we identified key characteristics and applications of integrated safety
and security risk assessment methods.
• There are two types of integrated safety and security risk assessment methods
based on the steps involved in each method. They are: a. Sequential, and b.
Non-sequential.
• There are four ways in which the integrated safety and security risk assess-
ment methods have been developed. They are: a. The conventional safety
risk assessment method as the base and a variation of the safety risk assess-
ment method for security risk assessment, b. The conventional security risk
assessment method as the base and a variation of the security risk assess-
ment method for safety risk assessment, c. A combination of a conventional
safety risk assessment method, and a conventional security risk assessment
method, d. Others.
• Risk identification and risk analysis stages were given much attention com-
pared to the risk evaluation stage of the risk assessment process in the inte-
grated safety and security risk assessment methods.
• Transportation, power and utilities, and chemical were the three domains of
application for integrated safety and security risk assessment methods.
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The identified integrated safety and security risk assessment methods did not
take into account real-time system information to perform dynamic risk assess-
ment which needs to be addressed to make it more effective in the future. This
study provided the list of combinations of safety, and security risk assessment
methods used in the identified integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods. In the future, this would act as a base to investigate the other com-
binations of safety, and security risk assessment methods that could be used in
the development of more effective integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods. Furthermore, this study provided the type of applications and appli-
cation domains of the identified integrated safety and security risk assessment
methods. In the future, this would act as a starting point to evaluate the ap-
plicability of these methods in the other domains besides transportation, power
and utilities, and chemical.
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